Chip-off, ISP and JTAG in the UFS and encryption era
What chip-off, ISP and JTAG still yield on phones with UFS or eMMC storage and file-based or full-disk encryption, per SWGDE, NIST, AOSP, JEDEC and papers.
Updated
In short
SWGDE 18-F-003 v2.0 (2025-08-21) lists chip-off, ISP and JTAG as physical acquisition methods, says their data from a file-based (FBE) or full-disk (FDE) encrypted device "will be encrypted", and says methodologies at publication did not allow decryption of FBE data while the ability to decrypt FDE data varies. This guide reads that as mostly ciphertext on eMMC or UFS storage, with the caveat that AOSP says FBE alone leaves filesystem metadata unencrypted and requires metadata encryption on internal storage only from Android 11 launches. Published sources describe the methods for damaged and embedded flash devices but call them destructive or invasive, and for memory cards SWGDE and NIST describe write-blocked imaging instead. Easy JTAG and Medusa state UFS reading support without claiming decryption, but GMDSOFT's MD-NEXT page claims "extraction and decryption" and lock bypass, and Easy JTAG's notes list "DataProtect removal" and Xiaomi authorization-bypass logic (vendor statements that give no result for FBE devices).
What the standards say
SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 (version 2.0, 2025-08-21) defines physical acquisition as "A process that extracts data via a direct connection to the device storage area", including boot loader, chip-off, ISP and JTAG. It describes chip-off as a destructive process that involves removing and reading a memory chip, and ISP as reading an embedded Multi-Media Card (eMMC) chip through connections on the circuit board without removing it. Fuller definitions are in Mobile acquisition types. UFS is not mentioned in SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, and its ISP definition names eMMC only.
SWGDE's separate Best Practices for Chip-Off (15-F-002-1.0, 2016-02-08) is older than the encryption statement above. It says traditional acquisition methods should generally be attempted first, that the process should be considered destructive because the chip may be irreversibly removed from the board, and that good candidates "may include" damaged devices, password-locked devices with no bypass support, and devices without debugging enabled. That candidate list predates the FBE requirement described below, so the "password-locked devices" item should be read as a 2016 statement, not a current one (this guide's inference).
NIST SP 800-101 Rev. 1 (May 2014) is the other reference. Its publication page, retrieved 2026-11-10, shows Rev. 1 as superseding the 2007 edition and shows no later revision. NIST says chip-off needs the wear-levelling algorithm to be reverse engineered to produce a contiguous binary image, and that JTAG extraction is more common. The document mentions eMMC as present in "many of today's smartphones" and does not mention UFS. It predates the FBE requirement; this guide reads its remarks on locked devices as describing an earlier era (inference).
eMMC and UFS: what changes for reading the chip
JEDEC describes e.MMC as an embedded memory system made of both flash memory and a flash memory controller, which frees the host processor from low-level flash management. JESD84-B51B (September 2025) is the current version and replaces all past versions. JEDEC describes UFS as a high-speed serial interface for mobile and automotive use; JESD220H (UFS 5.0) was published in February 2026.
Two consequences follow, both marked as this guide's inference because none of the sources reviewed state them as such. First, because JEDEC places the controller inside the e.MMC package, a removed eMMC chip read through its own interface may present the controller's logical view of the storage. NIST (2014) says chip-off requires reverse engineering the wear-levelling algorithm and does not distinguish eMMC from other flash; whether that holds for an eMMC read through its own interface is not stated by any source reviewed. Second, UFS is a different electrical interface from eMMC, so the adapters and sockets are different. The EasyJTAG vendor article (March 2019) describes separate UFS sockets for BGA153, BGA95 and BGA254 packages, calling BGA153 "Most common for all phones" at that date; the vendor's menu on 2026-11-10 also lists a BGA297 socket.
The only peer-reviewed comparison this guide found is Rzayeva et al. (Sensors, 2026), a full-text open-access study of 18 physically damaged Android phones (14 eMMC, 4 UFS). The authors report that UFS packages needed a different handling profile from eMMC. Its thermal-trial table (Table 2) reports 7 UFS attempts with 5 successful extractions and 8 eMMC attempts with 7, pad damage medium for UFS and low for eMMC, and UFS read stability "partially unstable". The paper does not reconcile these counts with its per-device table (Table 4), which lists four UFS devices, all recorded as chip-off successes. These are very small samples from one lab, and the abstract says images were obtained from all 18 devices while Table 4 marks one chip-off as "Partial".
What an image of encrypted storage contains
On Android, AOSP says FBE has been supported since Android 7.0 and that devices launching with Android 10 or later must use it. Metadata encryption encrypts "whatever content is not encrypted by FBE" with a single key, and devices launched with Android 11 or higher must enable it on internal storage. AOSP's hardware-wrapped keys page describes an inline crypto engine as hardware that encrypts and decrypts data on its way to and from the storage device, usually a UFS or eMMC host controller, and says hardware-wrapped keys are known in raw form only to dedicated hardware. Read together, these pages indicate that user file contents and names are ciphertext on the storage chip, which is consistent with SWGDE's statement (inference). The AOSP metadata page also says filesystem metadata such as layouts, sizes and times is not encrypted by FBE alone, so a device without metadata encryption would expose it (inference). The key handling is covered in Android file-based encryption.
On iOS, Apple documents (page published 2026-08-03) that Data Protection creates a new 256-bit key for each file created on the data volume and gives it to the hardware AES engine, which encrypts the file as it is written to flash storage. See iOS, the Secure Enclave and extraction for how the passcode, device-bound key and lock state limit what an extraction can read.
The Rzayeva paper also addresses encryption. Its authors infer, from Android versions and manufacturer specifications, that FDE or FBE was present on at least 11 of the 18 devices, and state that the evidentiary value of a raw image may be substantially constrained without a lawful key extraction mechanism, exploit-assisted decryption or user-provided credentials. The paper does not report what fraction of the acquired content was readable; it states that application artifacts remained recoverable on several devices with partially corrupted storage, and does not say whether those devices were encrypted.
Where the methods are still described as useful
- Damaged devices. SWGDE 15-F-002 lists damaged devices as good chip-off candidates. Rzayeva et al. built their workflow around phones with water, impact, short-circuit and boot-failure damage, plus two PIN-locked devices, where standard acquisition was unavailable; for locked devices the authors say chip-level work was mainly used to save the dump and confirm its authenticity. Fukami et al. (2017) also open with seized devices that are physically damaged (abstract read only). Damage is the stated use case in both papers; the Fukami abstract does not discuss encryption.
- Older and feature phones (2014 statements; current use not established). NIST says feature phones were among the first devices with NOR flash and RAM, and says deleted data in device memory can be unrecoverable by logical or manual extraction. NIST also describes JTAG as a route to locked or slightly damaged devices. It does not say which device types the physical methods remain useful for.
- Memory cards (write-blocked imaging is described instead). SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 distinguishes adoptable removable media (encrypted with the device) from portable media, recommends imaging portable storage externally through a write blocker, and says ISP is not applicable when card storage is set to "Adoptable" because the data will be encrypted. NIST also recommends write-blocking a microSD card and imaging it with standard techniques.
- Embedded and IoT devices. SWGDE 15-F-002 says chip-off applies beyond phones. The vendor GMDSOFT lists "AI Speaker Chip-off extraction" for Amazon Echo, Kakao Mini and Naver Clova on its MD-NEXT page. None of the sources reviewed say whether those devices encrypt their flash, so the yield is not established here.
Risks and limits
Chip-off is destructive by SWGDE's definition, and NIST calls JTAG invasive because access frequently requires dismantling the device. Fukami et al. (abstract only; it describes MLC NAND chips and does not mention eMMC or UFS) report that errors in stored data grow between seizure and extraction through charge leakage, and that thermal chip removal can raise errors by two or more orders of magnitude, often leaving most data uncorrectable. They report that a read-retry mechanism recovered the original data in their tested chips if the chips had not been heavily used.
Flasher and programmer boxes carry their own cautions. NIST says nearly all flasher boxes were not designed for forensic use, that software labels can lead an examiner to erase a device instead of dumping it, that rebooting may activate authentication, and that many return data in encrypted form. Some boxes below state that they can write as well as read. SWGDE 15-F-002 advises a validated chip reader, a check that output size roughly matches chip capacity, and hashing the output. See validating mobile forensics tools.
What hardware vendors in the directory state
All entries below are vendor statements as retrieved on 2026-11-10 unless dated otherwise. Most entries describe reading ability; the GMDSOFT page also states decryption and lock-bypass capabilities, the MOBILedit page screen-lock bypass (Ultra edition), and the Easy JTAG notes protection-removal and authorization-bypass items. None of the pages reviewed says what a chip-off, ISP or JTAG read of an FBE device returns.
- Easy JTAG Plus. The vendor's UFS article (published March 2019, describing the original implementation) lists identification, multiple-LUN access, reading, writing and attribute access. Release notes for version 2.1.0.0 (2025-12-01) add UFS smart reports, unlock configuration and "DataProtect removal" on compatible models. The notes do not explain what DataProtect protects and do not claim to decrypt user data. They also list "improved authorization-bypass logic for selected Xiaomi models".
- Medusa Pro II. The vendor home page describes a solution for servicing memory chips and reviving hard-bricked phones, with UFS support "including ISP connection" and UFS transfer speeds of 100 MB/s (reading) and 55 MB/s (writing). A vendor news item dated 2024-09-19 says Medusa PRO Software v.2.2.5.5 added UFS 3.1 and UFS 4.0 low-voltage mode.
- PC-3000 Flash. ACE Lab's product page describes desoldering a NAND chip and reading it with a Flash reader when the controller cannot be used, with a target list of USB drives, memory cards, monolithic flash devices and iPhone 2G, 3G and 3GS "(without hardware encryption)"; no Android phone model is listed. Version 9.4.6 (2026-08-05) added XOR entries and read-retry algorithms for newer Intel and Samsung NAND. PC-3000 Mobile is a separate product: ACE Lab's 2025-07-30 post on PC-3000 Mobile PRO 2.10x says it is "available only for LEA", and no public support matrix was found.
- RIFF Box. The official site's feed was last built on 2022-09-13, and the directory lists the product as unmaintained. The v2 announcement (2016-08-09) lists SD/MMC at up to 52 MHz and JTAG cores from ARM7 to Cortex-A15 among others and does not mention UFS; a vendor news post of 2019-10-24 says a plugin for processing eMMC image files was renamed "eMMC/UFS partition manager" and does not say whether it reads UFS chips.
- GMDSOFT MD-NEXT (the directory also records the alias Hancom MD-NEXT) lists MD-READER for chip-off memory and MD-BOX for JTAG boards. Under the heading "Supports extraction and decryption of the latest Asian phone" the same undated page lists lock-bypass and unlock claims for Samsung Galaxy S, J, A and Note series, vendor-backup extraction for Samsung, LG and Huawei, and local-backup extraction for Huawei, Xiaomi, Oppo and Gionee; it does not say which apply to a chip-off or JTAG read or to FBE devices (vendor claims).
- Analysis side. Belkasoft X (vendor page) and MOBILedit Forensic (vendor page) each state that they open images from JTAG or chip-off. They open dumps from chip readers; they also acquire from the device (Belkasoft X: Qualcomm and MTK dumps; MOBILedit Ultra: physical images, including behind a screen lock per the vendor). Neither page describes reading a chip.
Not known
No source reviewed reports how much user data a chip-off, ISP or JTAG image of a current FBE device yields in readable form (Rzayeva et al. report image-acquisition success only), a public description of how SWGDE's FBE statement was derived, or an independent test of any UFS reader listed above.
Sources
- SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition (Version 2.0, 2025-08-21)
- SWGDE 15-F-002-1.0, Best Practices for Chip-Off (Version 1.0, 2016-02-08)
- NIST SP 800-101 Rev. 1, Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics (May 2014)
- NIST CSRC, SP 800-101 Rev. 1 publication page (retrieved 2026-11-10)
- JEDEC, e.MMC focus-area page (JESD84-B51B, September 2025; retrieved 2026-11-10)
- JEDEC, UFS (Universal Flash Storage) focus-area page (retrieved 2026-11-10)
- Android Open Source Project, File-based encryption (page last updated 2026-10-30)
- Android Open Source Project, Metadata encryption (page last updated 2026-09-30)
- Android Open Source Project, Hardware-wrapped keys (page last updated 2026-09-30)
- Apple Platform Security Guide, Data Protection overview (published 2026-08-03; retrieved 2026-11-10)
- Rzayeva, Alibek, Abdykassym, Zhakenov, AI-Assisted ISP and Chip-Off Forensic Framework for Damaged Android Devices, Sensors 26(12):3639 (2026, open access, full text read)
- Fukami, Ghose, Luo, Cai, Mutlu, Improving the reliability of chip-off forensic analysis of NAND flash memory devices, Digital Investigation (March 2017; publisher page not retrievable)
- Semantic Scholar Graph API record for Fukami et al. (2017), abstract text (only the abstract was read)
- Z3X Team / EasyJTAG, UFS Memory (article published March 2019, retrieved 2026-11-10, vendor)
- Z3X Team / EasyJTAG, EasyJTAG Plus Version 2.1.0.0 release notes (2025-12-01, vendor)
- Medusa Box (GSMServer team), home page (undated, retrieved 2026-11-10, vendor)
- Medusa Box, news item: Medusa PRO Software v.2.2.5.5 (2024-09-19, vendor)
- ACE Lab, PC-3000 Flash product page (undated, retrieved 2026-11-10, vendor)
- ACE Lab, The New PC-3000 Flash Software Ver. 9.4.6 has been released (2026-08-05, vendor)
- ACE Lab official Telegram channel, PC-3000 Mobile PRO 2.10x post (2025-07-30, vendor)
- RIFF Box (Rocker Team) site feed, last built 2022-09-13 (vendor)
- RIFF Box (Rocker Team), RIFF Box version 2 announcement (posted 2016-08-09, vendor)
- RIFF Box (Rocker Team), eMMC/UFS partition manager v5.09 news post (2019-10-24, vendor)
- GMDSOFT, Mobile Forensic Software / MD-NEXT product page (undated, retrieved 2026-11-10, vendor)
- Belkasoft, Belkasoft X product page (undated, retrieved 2026-11-10, vendor)
- MOBILedit, MOBILedit Forensic product page (undated, retrieved 2026-11-10, vendor)