Android file-based encryption and what extraction yields

How Android moved from full-disk to file-based encryption, where the keys live (TEE, StrongBox, Titan M), and what public sources say extraction yields on FBE.

Updated

In short

Android moved from full-disk encryption (FDE), introduced in Android 4.4, to file-based encryption (FBE), which the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) says every device launching with Android 10 or later must use. Under FBE the keys for user data are stored encrypted, protected by hardware-bound Keystore keys and, for credential-encrypted data, by the user's credential, which is guarded by rate-limiting in a TEE or secure element. SWGDE's 2025 best-practice document says that data from a physical acquisition (which it defines to include chip-off) of a device that uses FBE will be encrypted, and, in the same passage, that methodologies did not allow decryption of FBE data at the time of publication. What a commercial extraction or a chipset boot mode yields is not documented in public detail: the vendors cited publish broad coverage claims or device-family lists, not public support matrices; by AOSP's design (this guide's inference), credential-encrypted data depends on lock state.

From full-disk to file-based encryption

AOSP's full-disk encryption page says FDE arrived in Android 4.4 and that Android 5.0 added hardware-backed storage of the encryption key using the TEE's signing capability. Under FDE a single key protects the whole userdata partition, and the user must provide credentials before any part of it is accessible (AOSP encryption overview). AOSP's FBE page says FBE has been supported since Android 7.0, together with Direct Boot, and that all devices launching with Android 10 and higher are required to use it. The FDE page adds that Android 10 to 12 allow FDE only on devices upgraded from Android 9 or lower, and that Android 13 removes FDE support entirely.

Other milestones in AOSP's documentation:

Android Change AOSP page
9 Metadata encryption supported; Keymaster 4 with embedded secure element support Metadata, Keystore
11 Metadata encryption required on internal storage for devices launching with 11 or higher; hardware-wrapped keys introduced; FBE policy version 2 required by the CDD for launching devices Metadata, Hardware-wrapped keys, FBE
12 KeyMint HAL replaces Keymaster Keystore

These are AOSP implementation pages that were live on 2026-11-01. This guide did not open the Compatibility Definition Document (CDD) text itself.

What FBE does and does not cover

On an FBE device each user has credential-encrypted (CE) storage, available only after the user has unlocked the device, and device-encrypted (DE) storage, also available in Direct Boot (AOSP FBE). AOSP's storage-class table puts app data under /data/data, /data/user and /data/media in CE, and system areas such as /data/app and /data/system in system DE. A few directories are not covered by FBE at all; on devices with metadata encryption they are protected by the metadata key instead.

FBE encrypts file contents and file names. AOSP states that directory layouts, file sizes, permissions and creation and modification times are not encrypted by FBE, and that metadata encryption uses a single boot-time key, protected by KeyMint and Verified Boot, to encrypt whatever FBE does not (AOSP metadata encryption).

That gap was studied in 2019. Gross, Ahmadova and Mueller's paper (DOI) reports, in its abstract, that from the raw data of an FBE-encrypted disk the unencrypted file metadata allowed reconstruction of the name, version and installation date of all installed apps (based on a dataset of 3,903 applications), and for WhatsApp the time of the last sent or received message (abstract text). The authors conclude that FBE is "significantly more insecure than FDE". The abstract does not say whether the devices tested had metadata encryption, and the full text was not retrievable for this guide, so how much of this leakage survives on devices launched with Android 11 or later is not established here.

Where the keys live

AOSP describes the chain as follows (FBE, key storage and protection):

  • Keys are managed by vold and stored encrypted on disk. Apart from internal-storage CE keys, each is encrypted with its own Keystore key that is "not exposed outside the TEE", so FBE keys cannot be unlocked unless a trusted operating system has booted, as enforced by Verified Boot. The same page requires KeyMint (or Keymaster) and Gatekeeper to run in a TEE so that an unauthorized, custom OS cannot simply request the DE keys.
  • Internal-storage CE keys cannot be unlocked without the lock-screen credential (LSKF), a passcode-reset token, or the client-side and server-side keys of a Resume-on-Reboot operation. The LSKF is stretched with scrypt (targeting about 25 ms and 2 MiB). AOSP says that step usually adds little security, and that the main layer is rate-limiting enforced in the secure element or TEE through Weaver, or in the TEE through Gatekeeper where Weaver is absent.

Hardware matters here. AOSP's key attestation page describes a TEE as highly resistant to remote compromise and moderately resistant to direct hardware attack, and StrongBox, implemented in a secure element, as highly resistant to both. Weaver arrived in Android 8.1 and can run in a dedicated secure element or in a TEE. Google states that Titan M2 on Pixel 6 supports StrongBox and was tested against the AVA_VAN.5 vulnerability-assessment level by an independent lab (Google Security Blog, 2021-10-27). Hardware-wrapped keys, introduced in Android 11 where hardware supports them, keep raw storage keys known only to dedicated hardware, aimed at cold-boot and memory-leak attacks.

For the rate-limit numbers: AOSP states that a device meeting only the minimum requirements of Android 16 allows 1,800 guesses in five years, while Android 16 QPR2 and higher apply a stronger default policy that allows no further guesses after 20 incorrect ones. Pixel-specific detail is in GrapheneOS and forensic tools.

Lock state on Android

Because CE is available only after first unlock, a device that has booted but not been unlocked exposes DE but not CE to anything running on it. The Johns Hopkins review (Zinkus, Jois and Green, 2021) found that Android has no analogue of iOS Complete Protection, so keys remain in memory after first unlock; it treats CE as equivalent to Apple's AFU class and DE to its unprotected class. That analysis concerned Android 10 and 11. BFU vs AFU covers lock state and inactivity reboots; this guide does not repeat them.

What each acquisition level yields on an FBE device

Level definitions are in acquisition types. Applied to FBE:

  • Logical. Google's adb documentation says that on Android 4.2.2 and higher the authorization dialog ensures adb commands cannot run unless the device can be unlocked and the dialog acknowledged. ADB provides no lock bypass, and Android Triage (unmaintained since 2022-10) only drives adb. Whatever such a method returns is limited to what the running OS can read; reading AOSP's definition of CE storage, that excludes CE content in BFU (this guide's inference).
  • File system and "full file system". SWGDE says extracting a mobile device's storage may require installing a bootloader or software client, gaining root access or accepting wireless connections, and that these techniques may leave artefacts (SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, section 3). By AOSP's design, whether CE content is readable then depends on whether the CE keys are loaded, that is, on lock state (this guide's inference).
  • Vendor statements on file system extraction. Magnet says Graykey extracts data from iOS and Android and decrypts Android keystore data (product page). Its iOS 26 post says the iOS 26 support details are in a customer-only support portal or in the support matrix inside the product; no equivalent statement about Android support was found, and neither Magnet page gives a per-model or per-state list. Cellebrite says its Advanced Services lab service (see also Cellebrite Premium) can determine or disable screen locks on the latest iOS and Android devices and retrieve the full file system, for law enforcement with legal authority (vendor page). The same undated page has a supported-devices section that labels device families as FBE or FDE. For Samsung it names Galaxy S10 to S22, Note 10 and 20, and A Series 2019 to 2022 as FBE; for Huawei, P20, P30, P40 and Mate 20, 30 and 40; for Google Pixel and other brands it names the brand without models. It adds that AFU access is also possible, that some limitations may apply, and that current capabilities are in its customer portal. These are vendor claims, and the newest Samsung model named is the S22 (2022).
  • Physical via a chipset boot mode. Covered in the next section. No source read for this guide states what a raw read taken through a chipset boot mode returns on an FBE device; the next section gives the one related statement, from 2021, which does not name FBE. SWGDE's physical-acquisition statement, quoted below, lists a "Boot Loader" method but does not say whether chipset boot modes fall under it.
  • JTAG, ISP and chip-off. SWGDE (18-F-003-2.0, section 6, version dated 2025-08-21) defines physical acquisition as including Boot Loader, chip-off, in-system programming (ISP) and JTAG, and says the resulting data from a device that uses FBE or FDE "will be encrypted". It adds that, at the time of publication, methodologies did not allow decryption of FBE data, and that the ability to decrypt FDE data varies. The document does not give its reasoning. From AOSP, this guide infers a likely basis: user data is encrypted before it is committed to disk, and the keys are wrapped by hardware-bound Keystore keys or derived from the synthetic password behind rate-limiting, so neither is available from the chip's contents. SWGDE does not say which areas of the chip the statement covers. On devices without metadata encryption, AOSP says FBE leaves the file-system metadata described above unencrypted. The AOSP pages read here do not say whether any other user-data area is left in plaintext.

ALEAPP and similar parsers do not change this. Their input is an existing extraction or image, and ALEAPP's modules read files by declared path, so ciphertext names and contents would not match them (this guide's inference).

Chipset-level tooling: what the entries claim

MTKClient targets MediaTek chipsets. Its README at tag v2.1.4.1 (2026-03-18) describes it as a tool for "exploitation, reading/writing flash", credits the kamakiri and linecode exploits among others, and its usage guide lists reading partitions or the full flash, reading eFuses and RPMB, and writing, erasing and bootloader-unlock functions (README, usage). The default branch is 76 commits ahead of that tag as of 2026-11-01, so behaviour described only on main is unreleased. edl is a Python client for Qualcomm's Sahara and Firehose protocols; its README lists dumping eMMC and UFS partitions, memory and fuses, and a command to dump the "crypto footer". The term appears on AOSP's FDE page in its description of the FDE encryption flow, and the README does not say what the command returns on an FBE device. Its last tagged release, 3.52.1, dates from 2021-08-07, and the README on the default branch has changed since.

Neither README nor the MTKClient usage guide, as read on 2026-11-01, mentions decrypting user data or FBE. They document access to flash contents and, in the usage guide, reading and writing device memory, generating RPMB keys, and a command to extract keys; none of them says what those memory contents or keys relate to on an FBE device. Both tools are dual-use: the same commands write and erase. MTKClient's usage guide pairs bootloader unlock with wiping the userdata and metadata partitions (its "Unlock bootloader" section erases first, while its "Unlock flow for stock mtk with android >=9" section unlocks first and then wipes), which matches the Johns Hopkins review's statement that unlocking an Android bootloader deletes personal data. That review also states that Qualcomm EDL programmers have been used to obtain root and exfiltrate data even on encrypted devices, and that certain MediaTek devices can be rewritten without a bootloader unlock using a public flash tool. Citing Privacy International, it adds that forensic vendors including Cellebrite and Magnet employ Qualcomm EDL programmers to extract data. It recommends that SoC vendors and OEMs secure the low-level firmware programming interface. Those are 2021 statements about then-current devices and do not describe any specific model today.

Heimdall is a different kind of tool: its README describes flashing firmware to Samsung devices over the Odin 3 protocol, and describes no extraction.

OEM variation and what is not public

FBE is an AOSP framework that manufacturers enable on their devices and can optimise for the system on chip (SoC) they use (FBE page). AOSP lets vendors choose content and file-name algorithms and optional inline encryption hardware, and says a vendor-implemented ice contents mode, with a vendor-specific on-disk format, was accepted on devices launched with Android 10 or lower and is not allowed on devices launching with Android 11 or higher. Weaver versus Gatekeeper, a dedicated secure element versus the TEE, and hardware-wrapped keys are also implementation choices (FBE, Weaver, hardware-wrapped keys). The Johns Hopkins review describes the Android ecosystem as fragmented and notes Samsung's Secure Processor and Google's Titan M as separate security chips.

What no source read for this guide provides: a public per-model list of which devices use metadata encryption, hardware-wrapped keys or a secure element; a vendor support matrix that is public in detail; or independent testing of current-generation devices against the commercial tools above. The linked Graykey entry cites one NIST/DHS CFTT report (cover reads January 2024, title page April 2024) that covered a Galaxy S22 on Android 12 and measured acquisition of pre-populated data; the report does not state the phone's lock state or which extraction type was run on it (it says only that "Each supported data extraction technique was performed"). Treat any specific capability claim as dated and vendor-attributed, and validate against the device in front of you.

Sources

  1. Android Open Source Project, Encryption overview (page last updated 2026-09-30)
  2. Android Open Source Project, File-based encryption (page last updated 2026-10-30)
  3. Android Open Source Project, Full-disk encryption (page last updated 2026-09-30)
  4. Android Open Source Project, Metadata encryption (page last updated 2026-09-30)
  5. Android Open Source Project, Hardware-wrapped keys (page last updated 2026-09-30)
  6. Android Open Source Project, Keystore (page last updated 2026-09-30)
  7. Android Open Source Project, Key and ID attestation (page last updated 2026-09-30)
  8. Android Open Source Project, Weaver (page last updated 2026-09-30)
  9. Android Open Source Project, Rate-limiting (page last updated 2026-09-30)
  10. Google Security Blog, Pixel 6: Setting a new standard for mobile security (2021-10-27)
  11. Zinkus, Jois, Green (Johns Hopkins), Data Security on Mobile Devices: Current State of the Art, Open Problems, and Proposed Solutions (arXiv v1, 2021-05-26)
  12. Gross, Ahmadova, Mueller, Analyzing Android's File-Based Encryption: Information Leakage through Unencrypted Metadata (ARES 2019, ACM; publisher page not retrievable, abstract read via the Semantic Scholar record below)
  13. Semantic Scholar Graph API record for Gross, Ahmadova, Mueller (2019), abstract text
  14. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition (v2.0, 2025-08-21; supersedes v1.2 of 2020-09-17)
  15. Android Developers, Android Debug Bridge (adb), retrieved 2026-11-01
  16. MTKClient README at tag v2.1.4.1 (2026-03-18)
  17. MTKClient usage guide at tag v2.1.4.1
  18. edl README (default branch, checked 2026-11-01; last tag 3.52.1 is dated 2021-08-07)
  19. Heimdall README (original repository)
  20. Magnet Forensics, Magnet Graykey product page (vendor, retrieved 2026-11-01)
  21. Magnet Forensics, Magnet Forensics support for iOS 26 (2025-10-01, vendor)
  22. Cellebrite, Advanced Services page (vendor, undated, retrieved 2026-11-01)
  23. NIST/DHS, Test Results for Mobile Device Acquisition Tool: Magnet Graykey AppLogic v4.1.0 and AXIOM Examine v8.0.0 (cover reads January 2024, title page April 2024)