Mobile acquisition types: logical, file system, full file system, physical, chip-off, JTAG and ISP

Definitions of the mobile acquisition levels and what each can realistically yield on file-based-encrypted Android and Data Protection iOS devices.

Updated

In short

Mobile acquisition terms are not standardised: SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 (version 2.0, 2025-08-21) lists device logs, file system, logical and physical methods, NIST SP 800-101r1 (May 2014) uses a five-level pyramid, and the vendor label "advanced logical" appears in neither. NIST states that moving up its pyramid makes acquisition more invasive and expensive and that the risk of altering or destroying data rises with the level. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 states that data from a physical acquisition of a device using file-based or full-disk encryption "will be encrypted" and that, at the time of publication, methodologies do not allow decryption of FBE data; it does not say which areas of storage that statement covers. On iOS, the 2021 Johns Hopkins review found no public evidence that extracting the device UID from silicon was economically feasible, while Elcomsoft's April 2026 vendor blog reports an extraction agent for iOS 17 and iOS 18 (through 18.7.1) whose installation needs a trusted connection; that is a vendor claim.

Terminology is not standardised

"Logical", "file system", "physical" and similar labels are used differently by standards bodies and vendors. Two neutral references disagree on granularity. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 (version 2.0, 2025-08-21) lists acquisition methods, organised alphabetically rather than in order of operations: device logs, file system (with after first unlock, before first unlock, full file system and partial file system sub-types), logical (which includes manual interaction with the device display), and physical (boot loader, chip-off, ISP and JTAG). Its superseded predecessor, version 1.2 (2020-09-17), listed five levels (manual, logical, file system, physical non-invasive, physical invasive), with JTAG, ISP and chip-off as the invasive sub-types. NIST SP 800-101r1 (May 2014) uses a five-level pyramid: manual, logical, hex dumping/JTAG, chip-off and micro read.

NIST states that moving up the pyramid makes acquisition more technical, invasive, time consuming and expensive, that once one level has been used the lower levels may no longer be possible (its example is chip-off), and that the risk of altering or destroying data rises with the level. The vendor label "advanced logical" appears in neither SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 nor NIST SP 800-101r1, and "full file system" (FFS) appears in SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 but not in NIST. Treat vendor labels as product terms and check what the tool actually reads.

The levels

Device logs. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 defines this as "A process of extracting available device, system, and crash logs (e.g., Sysdiagnose, unified logging, live system logs, and other crash reports) for analysis", and says that because some logs are intended for operating system diagnostics they are often available in alternate device states.

Manual. Operating the device's interface and recording what is displayed. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 treats it as a logical technique: "direct interaction with the device display to photograph/video/document data accessible via the user interface". NIST lists it as its own level and notes that deleted information cannot be recovered at this level.

Logical. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 defines it as "A process that requests file data from the operating system, which then interprets and returns the resultant data", and says the techniques can include backup utilities, application agents and manual interaction. NIST describes the tool sending commands over a wired or wireless connection and the device answering, and warns that different connection types can modify data (its example is unread SMS status). On iOS, version 1.2 said that since iOS 11 a trust relationship between the device and the computer requires the device's passcode, so a logical extraction is possible only when the passcode is entered; version 2.0 does not repeat that statement. Version 2.0 does say that backups may be password protected and/or encrypted and that, if possible, the examiner should obtain the backup-encryption password, because it is often different from the device password. Elcomsoft's "advanced logical" label covers backup, media files, shared files, crash logs and Apple Unified Logs (vendor product page).

File system. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 defines it as "A process that requests the active files and folders from the file system", adding that the acquisition "can contain remnants of deleted data and non-user data". Its sub-types are after first unlock (AFU), before first unlock (BFU), full file system (FFS, "A complete collection of all available active files and folders") and partial file system. Elcomsoft pairs the term "full file system extraction" with keychain decryption and says its logical acquisition returns less information than low-level extraction (vendor product page); other vendors may use the label differently. Elcomsoft describes its approach as installing an extraction agent on the device. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 adds that extraction of device storage may require installing a bootloader or software client, gaining root access, or accepting wireless connections, that these techniques may leave digital artifacts, and that contemporaneous notes are necessary.

Physical (boot loader). SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 lists "Boot Loader" under physical: "Code that executes in a runtime environment prior to operating system initialization. Physical acquisitions using this method replace the existing code." (Version 1.2 instead had a "physical non-invasive" level, defined as physical acquisition without opening the case.) The nearest NIST category is "hex dumping" (this guide's mapping), but the two descriptions are not identical: NIST describes uploading a modified boot loader (or other software) into a protected area of memory such as RAM, with the device's data port connected to a flasher box, which then captures flash memory and sends it to the workstation, whereas SWGDE says boot-loader physical acquisitions replace the existing code. NIST lists limits that remain instructive: the device often has to reboot, which can trigger authentication; data may come back encrypted; and not all memory ranges are reachable.

JTAG. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0: data is acquired via connection to the defined test access ports, which involves disassembling the device and connecting to JTAG-defined locations on the PCB. NIST adds that JTAG can image locked or slightly damaged devices but is invasive because the wiring points often require dismantling.

ISP (in-system programming). SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0: a process to read data from an embedded Multi-Media Card (eMMC) chip, disassembling the device and connecting to locations on the printed circuit board that trace back to the eMMC without removing it.

Chip-off. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0: a destructive process that involves the removal and reading of a memory chip. NIST notes that the wear-levelling algorithm must be reverse engineered to produce a contiguous image and that chips can be damaged.

Micro read. NIST describes observing the gates of a NAND or NOR chip with an electron microscope and says (in 2014) that no commercial tools existed and no known US law-enforcement agency performed it. It is not a routine method.

What encryption does to each level

Android. File-based encryption (FBE) has been supported since Android 7.0, and all devices launching with Android 10 or later are required to use it. Files sit in either credential-encrypted (CE) storage, available only after the user unlocks the device, or device-encrypted (DE) storage, available during Direct Boot. Per the same page, CE keys are protected by a per-user synthetic password, the lock-screen credential is stretched with scrypt, and guesses are rate-limited by Weaver (backed by a secure element or the TEE) or, on devices without Weaver, by Gatekeeper in the TEE. Before first unlock, CE file names appear Base64-encoded because the key is not yet available.

SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 states that the data resulting from a physical acquisition of a device that uses file-based or full-disk encryption "will be encrypted", that "At the time of publication, methodologies do not allow for decryption of FBE data" (version 2.0 is dated 2025-08-21), and that "The ability to decrypt FDE data varies". The document does not say which areas of the storage that statement covers. On a running device, device-encrypted storage is available before first unlock by design, and the AOSP page lists some /data directories that FBE does not protect (protected instead by metadata encryption on devices that use it), so what a given read returns can depend on the device (this guide's inference). See BFU vs AFU for how lock state changes this.

iOS. Apple's Data Protection assigns each file to a class, and access depends on whether the class key has been unlocked. The passcode is entangled with the device UID, so brute-force attempts must run on the device, and each attempt is calibrated to take about 80 milliseconds. The 2021 Johns Hopkins review (Zinkus, Jois and Green) states that keys must be derived on the device unless the UID is physically extracted from silicon, and found no public evidence that the latter is economically feasible. A raw read of flash from a modern iPhone is therefore not a route to plaintext on public evidence. Elcomsoft's "true physical acquisition" is offered only for legacy devices: several 32-bit iPhones and, per its Perfect Acquisition section, A8/A8X devices such as the iPhone 6, iPad mini 4 and iPad Air 2 (vendor page).

In practice, for current devices the question is usually not "which level" but "which state is the device in, and is an exploit or the credential available". Elcomsoft reported in April 2026 that its agent supports iOS 16.7 through 16.7.15, all of iOS 17 and iOS 18 up to 18.7.1 on A11 to A18 devices (the A11 iPhones being covered on iOS 16), but that installation requires a trusted connection, which on Elcomsoft's description means entering the passcode on the device, or biometrics where Stolen Device Protection is on (vendor blog). That is a vendor statement and applies to that product and version only.

Where tool categories fit

Category What the cited sources say Site pages
Multi-method acquisition and analysis suites Support is device- and version-specific; each tool page lists the methods it documents Cellebrite, MSAB XRY, Oxygen, Belkasoft X
Exploit- and agent-based access tools Elcomsoft documents an on-device agent and a bootloader method (vendor). TechCrunch describes Graykey as an iPhone and Android extraction tool Magnet Graykey, Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit, checkra1n
Device-communication libraries libimobiledevice describes itself as a library to communicate with iOS devices natively libimobiledevice
JTAG, ISP, chip-off Specialist hardware and lab procedures not covered by individual tool pages
Parsing and analysis after acquisition Work on extractions, not on devices iLEAPP, ALEAPP, Autopsy

The Johns Hopkins review states that in 2021 law-enforcement agencies could obtain forensic extractions of even the latest iPhones through companies including Elcomsoft, Cellebrite and Oxygen, and that the common design is an extraction agent that reads available files and sends them to the examiner's computer. Check each tool page for dated, sourced support statements, and see choosing a mobile forensics tool for validating whatever you rely on.

Sources

  1. NIST SP 800-101 Rev. 1, Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics (May 2014)
  2. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation Handling and Acquisition (Version 2.0, 2025-08-21)
  3. SWGDE 18-F-003, Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation, Handling, and Acquisition (Version 1.2, 2020-09-17; superseded by 2.0)
  4. Android Open Source Project, File-based encryption
  5. Apple Platform Security Guide, Data Protection overview
  6. Apple Platform Security Guide, Passcodes and passwords
  7. Zinkus, Jois, Green (Johns Hopkins), Data Security on Mobile Devices (2021)
  8. Elcomsoft iOS Forensic Toolkit product page (vendor)
  9. Elcomsoft blog, Low-Level Extraction for iOS 17 and 18 (2026-04-14, vendor)
  10. TechCrunch, New Apple security feature reboots iPhones after 3 days, researchers confirm (2024-11-14)
  11. libimobiledevice project site