SIM and eSIM forensics: what the card holds and what it does not
What a UICC/USIM stores, how card and handset data overlap, PIN/PUK limits, isolation cards, and what is publicly known about eSIM examination.
Updated
In short
A SIM, strictly a UICC, is a smart card whose file system holds subscriber identifiers and location information and, depending on the card, messages and phonebook entries; the same categories can sit in the handset instead, and NIST directs examiners to examine both. Exhausting the PIN and PUK retry counters can block the card, so they are a hard handling limit. GSMA uses "eSIM" for devices and eUICCs that support remote provisioning, with the operator's subscription held as a profile on an eUICC that may be non-removable, so there may be no card to pull. The public sources reviewed here describe no validated eSIM-specific forensic tool; the routes they mention are data read from the handset's operating system, carrier records, chip-off in one vendor glossary, and eUICC commands through a card reader in two open-source projects with no forensic validation found (pySim and ForenSIM).
What the card is and what it holds
NIST SP 800-101r1 (May 2014) says a UICC is a smart card that typically contains a processor and 16 to 128 KB of persistent memory, a typical figure from 2014. Its file system is a tree of a master file (MF), directory files (DF) and elementary files (EF), and a UICC can carry up to three applications (SIM, USIM, CSIM). NIST lists the data in standard EFs as identifiers (ICCID, IMSI), phonebook and last-numbers-dialed records (ADN, LND), SMS and EMS messages, and location information (LAI and RAI), and adds that operators may define non-standard files. The legacy GSM SIM application's file layout is in a separate specification that this guide did not review.
In ETSI TS 102 221 V18.4.0 (2026-05), EFICCID is a mandatory 10-byte file at the MF level with read access ALW (always) and update access NEV (never). In 3GPP TS 31.102 V20.0.0 (2026-09), the USIM application's files include:
- EFIMSI (optional, 9 bytes), holding the IMSI.
- EFLOCI (mandatory, 11 bytes), holding the TMSI, location area information and location update status.
- EFSMS (optional, linear fixed, 176-byte records), holding short messages.
- EFMSISDN (optional), holding the subscriber's MSISDN(s).
- EFEPSLOCI (optional), holding the GUTI, last registered tracking area and EPS update status.
TS 31.102 sets the read access condition of EFIMSI, EFLOCI, EFSMS and EFMSISDN to PIN, and TS 102 221 says a PIN-protected file requires PIN verification "unless the PIN is disabled". For those files, whether the PIN is enabled decides whether they can be read without verification; other files use other conditions, such as ALW for EFICCID.
Card data and handset data overlap
NIST states that information managed by UICC applications may coexist in handset memory, and may reside entirely in the handset instead of the memory reserved on the card. Most of the 3GPP files above are optional or tied to optional service entries. No source reviewed measures how often current cards hold contacts or messages, so this guide makes no claim about that.
NIST says that for devices requiring a UICC there are two items to examine, the handset and the UICC, acquired jointly or separately. For an inactive device it describes acquiring the UICC directly through a PC/SC reader first. A joint acquisition can change unread text messages to read, because reading them through the handset changes the flag; a UICC read directly by a tool does not. NIST suggests omitting UICC recovery from the joint acquisition if the tool allows, and notes that removing the SIM can reportedly cause data to be deleted on some handsets.
SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 (Version 2.0, 2025-08-21) says little on this. Its acquisition steps include one headed "Process External Media/SIM" (6.1.2.6); the text under it says to process external media outside the device when possible, to allow a physical rather than a file-system acquisition, and does not describe reading a SIM. For a device received off and undamaged it recommends removing external media before processing (6.2.2.1) and reinstalling removed external media and/or SIM before the most comprehensive acquisition available (6.2.2.3). It adds that on feature phones, lack or removal of an identity module may prevent access to handset memory. The earlier v1.2 (2020-09-17), which swgde.org still hosts, said examiners "must acquire and examine both" the device and the UICC/SIM, and advised separate extractions, card first, where message status matters. Version 2.0 contains none of that text.
The CFTT report on Cellebrite Inseyets.UFED v10.3.0.260 (report, testing dated September 2024) states its scope as acquisition of active data from the internal memory of supported handsets. As of MSAB's pages read 2026-11-01, the vendor lists "SIM Card Reading" among the product highlights of XRY Logical (see MSAB XRY), and a SIM card reader and "clone SIM cards" for the XRY Kiosk (platforms page). Those are vendor statements; the pages do not say which file types are read or what a clone contains. The directory's UFED entry lists no SIM-card reading, but on its CFID page, read 2026-11-01, Cellebrite advertises "full SIM and USIM extraction" on the CFID field device, which has no entry of its own here.
PIN and PUK: a handling limit
ETSI TS 102 221 describes three PIN attempts and ten UNBLOCK PIN (PUK) attempts. After three consecutive false PIN presentations, "not necessarily in the same card session", the PIN is blocked, so consecutive false attempts count across sessions, whoever made them; a correct presentation resets the counter to 3. After the tenth false UNBLOCK PIN, the UNBLOCK PIN itself is blocked. NIST says the card then "becomes blocked permanently".
The same specification defines a way to read the remaining-attempts counter without presenting a PIN: a VERIFY PIN command with an empty data field, which works whether or not the PIN is disabled or blocked. The Dekart product page states that SIM Explorer shows the state of PIN and PUK and the remaining attempts.
Among the methods NIST lists for a PIN-enabled GSM card are asking the owner, checking packaging for a printed PUK, and reading the ICCID to request the PUK from the service provider. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 notes that some devices allow only a limited number of wrong passcode attempts and that incorrect passcodes could lead to unrecoverable data; that concerns device passcodes, not the card.
Isolation cards and "SIM clones"
Some tools create what vendors call a "SIM clone". NIST calls the product a Cellular Network Isolation Card (CNIC) and says it is not a true clone because the authentication key and other user data are not copied; it adds that a CNIC contains no cipher key, which prevents access to the cellular network. A CNIC is tool specific and varies by handset, and some phones will not boot without a UICC. NIST calls inserting a foreign UICC "one of the most common mistakes", because some handsets linked to a specific card erase call logs and SMS when started with another one.
SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 likewise says inserting an identity module from another device may cause loss of data. For network isolation it names an RF-blocking container such as a Faraday bag or an RF-shielded enclosure; unlike v1.2, it does not name a CNIC. NIST has only an abbreviation-list entry for "eUICC", and SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 mentions eSIM once, in passing, as a way a phone number can move between devices. Neither covers eSIM examination.
Tools in this directory
- Dekart SIM Explorer is commercial Windows software that reads GSM SIM, USIM and R-UIM cards through a PC/SC reader and can back up a card to an image file and hash it. Dekart states that cards open read-only by default; the page also lists editing files, entering ADM codes and batch-writing cards. The directory marks it unmaintained: the vendor site's footer reads 1995-2021. The vendor's price on 2026-11-01 was USD 699.
- pySim is an Osmocom Python toolset for programming and browsing SIM, UICC and eUICC cards, aimed at operators of private cellular networks. Its README says production operator cards restrict which files can be read and written, and that full functionality needs programmable cards. The shell can write to cards when ADM credentials are available, and the manual describes no forensic workflow. This comes from the master-branch README and manual; the repository's only Git tag, 1.0 (commit dated 2021-02-25), predates pySim-shell, so none of it is in a tagged version.
- SIMtrace 2 is open Osmocom hardware and firmware that traces communication between a (U)SIM and a phone, forwards a remote SIM, or acts as a man-in-the-middle. Its README (latest tag 0.9.1) describes no forensic use, and the pySim README says its pySim-trace tool decodes such traces. Both are research and telecom-engineering tools, not forensic products.
eSIM: what changes
GSMA SGP.22 v3.1 (2023-12-01) is the highest-numbered consumer RSP version on GSMA's specification listing as of 2026-11-01. The listing also shows v2.7 (published 2026-04-24) as active, and SGP.22 says remote profile management was initially introduced in v3.0.0. This guide did not determine which version a given handset implements.
SGP.22 defines an eUICC as a removable or non-removable UICC that enables local or remote management of profiles. A profile is operator data and applications supporting a subscription. Each eUICC has a 32-digit EID, and a subscription manager (SM-DP+) binds a protected profile package to the EID and downloads it to the device's local profile assistant (LPA). SGP.21 requires the eUICC to be tamper resistant, either discrete (removable or non-removable) or integrated, and calls "eSIM" the generic descriptor for devices and eUICCs that support remote SIM provisioning. SGP.22 allows a removable eUICC, packaged in a form factor specified in ETSI TS 102 221.
Apple describes the eSIM as built into the iPhone (Apple Support) and says it cannot be removed if the phone is lost or stolen (Apple, 2024-05-14). That holds for non-removable and integrated parts, not for every eUICC. On Android, the AOSP documentation says profile management is generally done by the LPA, and that callers of the EuiccCardManager APIs must be an LPA, enforced by the framework. That describes the operating-system path.
Records that do exist on the eUICC include notifications. SGP.22 says that when a configured profile operation succeeds (install, enable, disable, delete), the eUICC generates and stores a notification carrying a sequence number, the operation, a recipient address, the ICCID and a signature. SGP.22 has the LPA remove a notification once the SM-DP+ acknowledges it, and lets the eUICC delete the oldest stored notifications when space runs out, so only undelivered or retained notifications would be expected.
What is publicly known about examiner access
Little. The MSAB XRY Logical and platforms pages and the Cellebrite CFID page, read 2026-11-01, do not mention eSIM, and the vendor and standards sources below name no eSIM-specific tool. Two open-source items do handle eUICCs: pySim's ISD-R commands and ForenSIM, whose repository describes itself as SIM and eSIM forensic extraction (see below).
- Standards and guidance. As above, NIST and SWGDE do not cover eSIM examination, and the CFTT reports for XRY Office v10.9.0 (report, July 2024) and Inseyets.UFED v10.3.0.260 contain no reference to eSIM.
- Vendor commentary. MSAB's glossary says eSIMs remove physical access, that tools designed for removable SIMs may not apply, and that tool developers "will likely create new features" for eSIM acquisition. It lists logical acquisition of profile-related data from the operating system, chip-off, and operator collaboration, with no tool names, device lists or validation results. It does not explain how a chip-off would yield profile contents from a component that SGP.21 requires to be tamper resistant, and no source reviewed does. A SalvationDATA article (2025-11-11) likewise names no tool or method.
- Research. An OpenAlex title search on 2026-11-01 found two IEEE conference papers on eSIM forensics; only their abstracts were read, because IEEE's site blocked automated access. The 2024 ISDFS paper describes itself as probing prospective methods for eSIM and iSIM forensics. The 2025 ICCC paper proposes a proof-of-concept framework for eSIM-enabled M2M and IoT devices such as vehicle trackers, not consumer phones.
- Research tooling. pySim's manual documents ISD-R commands that do what an LPA normally does (read the EID, list profiles and notifications) and commands that enable, disable or delete profiles and reset eUICC memory. No source reviewed shows its modem AT+CSIM transport reaching the embedded eUICC of a consumer phone. ForenSIM (created 2026-03-17, no tagged release) is a GUI over pySim whose README describes an eUICC tab, aimed at connected-car telematics units, that reads the EID and lists profiles. No validation of it was found.
Not found in the sources reviewed: any vendor's eUICC support matrix, how a commercial suite recovers profile metadata from a locked consumer phone, and any independent test of such a claim. Absence from this guide is not evidence that no capability exists.
Carrier and legal-process records
NIST notes that subscriber account data and call detail records from the network carrier are often a valuable source of evidence, that provider records can validate what the handset shows, and that provider call logs can be queried using subscriber or equipment identifiers. Which identifier a carrier accepts (IMSI, MSISDN, ICCID, IMEI) is not addressed in the sources reviewed. NIST also warns that carrier retention periods vary and are generally limited, so preservation requests need prompt action.
For eSIM, SGP.22 describes the SM-DP+ allocating profile packages to specific EIDs, and notifications carry the profile ICCID and a recipient (SM-DP+) address. SGP.22 (section 5.3, ES2+) requires an SM-DP+ to let the Profile Owner query a profile's current state or state history by ICCID or by EID. Whether a carrier or SM-DP+ accepts either identifier in a request from an investigating authority is not addressed in the sources reviewed, and the specification gives no retention period.
What process a carrier requires, and whether a request is lawful, varies by jurisdiction and is outside what these sources address. SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0 says to ensure proper legal authority before collecting or examining evidence, and to isolate devices from networks so data is not remotely modified or destroyed. MSAB's glossary mentions subpoenas and court orders for operator-held data, a vendor generalisation, not a statement of any one country's law. SGP.22 v3.1 defines remote profile management by an authorised SM-DP+, with each command subject to a confirmation request enforced by the LPA; whether that affects isolation of a seized phone is not addressed in SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0.
See also acquisition types for how handset acquisition levels differ, and choosing a mobile forensics tool.
Sources
- NIST SP 800-101 Rev. 1, Guidelines on Mobile Device Forensics (May 2014)
- SWGDE 18-F-003-2.0, Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation, Handling and Acquisition (Version 2.0, 2025-08-21)
- SWGDE 18-F-003, Best Practices for Mobile Device Evidence Collection & Preservation, Handling and Acquisition (Version 1.2, 2020-09-17; superseded by 2.0)
- ETSI TS 102 221 V18.4.0 (2026-05), Smart Cards; UICC-Terminal interface; Physical and logical characteristics (Release 18)
- 3GPP TS 31.102 V20.0.0 (2026-09), Characteristics of the USIM application (Release 20; zip archive containing the .docx)
- GSMA SGP.22 v3.1, RSP Technical Specification (2023-12-01)
- GSMA SGP.21 V3.1, RSP Architecture (2023-12-01)
- GSMA, eSIM specification listing (read 2026-11-01)
- Android Open Source Project, Embedded SIM (eSIM) overview
- Apple Support, Set up eSIM on iPhone (page dated 2026-10-22)
- Apple Support, About eSIM (2024-05-14)
- Dekart, SIM Explorer product page (vendor, read 2026-11-01)
- GitHub: osmocom/pysim, README (master)
- Osmocom pySim user manual (master): pySim-shell
- GitHub: osmocom/simtrace2, README
- MSAB, XRY Logical product page (vendor, read 2026-11-01)
- MSAB, XRY platforms page (vendor, read 2026-11-01)
- MSAB, Glossary: eSIM (vendor)
- DHS S&T / NIST CFTT, Test Results for Inseyets.UFED v10.3.0.260 and Inseyets.PA v10.3.0.3169 (testing dated September 2024)
- DHS S&T / NIST CFTT, Test Results for XRY Office v10.9.0 / XAMN v7.9.0 (testing dated July 2024)
- Cellebrite, CFID product page (vendor, read 2026-11-01)
- SalvationDATA, eSIM and Phone Forensics (knowledge article, 2025-11-11, vendor)
- Senol, Rasheed, Shashidar, Mobile Forensic Investigation: Extractions and Connectivity Isolation in Phones Utilizing eSIM, iSIM Technology (IEEE ISDFS 2024; abstract only)
- Himadhara Puthran S O, Amala R, Renin Roy K, Novel eSIM Forensic Framework for eSIM-Enabled M2M and IoT Devices (IEEE ICCC 2025; abstract only)
- GitHub: chaps2442/ForenSIM, README (created 2026-03-17)